Abstract. The Syrian uprising in 2011 was accompanied by the birth of a new generation of media outlets seeking to offer different narratives to those of the regime. Having gained a certain level of autonomy from both Syrian regime and opposition forces, areas historically inhabited by Kurds (Rojava) have also seen the emergence of local media: for example. television station Ronahi, magazines and newspapers such as Welat, Buyer and Shar magazines and newspapers, Arta FM and Welat radio stations and ARA News agency. Indeed, Syrian Kurds have for the first time in their history the opportunity to have an independent voice in the media landscape. This paper aims to map the field of emerging Kurdish media in Syria and analyse some of the main features of these outlets while situating them in the larger context of emerging Syrian media. Moreover, the paper explores their relationship within the current political context of the Syrian uprising and, especially, of Rojava. In doing so, it analyses the political identity that these media tend to project and addresses how they position themselves towards the issue of the Kurdish identity in general and in Syria in particular.
It is within this context and the opposition between the parties and some sectors of the civil society in Rojava that the birth of independent media has to be interpreted. Whereas party media are direct expressions of political parties and are financed by them, independent media in Rojava have more in common with a radical redefinition of the journalistic field all over Syria as a product of the media activism linked to the 2011 uprising. Indeed, during the five years of the uprising, Syria witnessed the emergence of dozens of new media organizations. Media activists who started to produce and exchange information on the uprising, as well as journalists with experiences in the media before 2011, soon decided to establish media outlets capable of conveying content in a more professional and institutionalized way. Most of these institutions tend to share an anti-regime stance, or at least the belief that a new media system has to be created in Syria (Badran and De Angelis 2015; De Angelis 2014) .
Emerging media in Syria's Kurdish regions initially followed similar patterns to the emergence of media in other parts in Syria. As the uprising spread into Kurdish regions, active mediation of the events became a significant part of the work of local activists. Facebook groups, and dedicated blogs were the basic platforms for sharing news, pictures, footage and announcements (Ebdi 2015) . Similarly to what happened in Syria's other regions, in Rojava these media activities went through a process of gradual institutionalization and professionalization. Since 2011 several media institutions began to emerge: radios such as Arta FM and Welat; newspapers such as Buyer, Welat and Shar; news agencies such as ARA News. As with the majority of the other Syrian media which emerged in the same period, all these outlets are supported by international organizations and governments or they rely on investments by local businessmen and communities. ARA News, for example, is supported by Free Press Unlimited and Sida. Arta is supported by Creative, an American private association funded by the US Congress. Welat is supported by several organisations including Basma, Adopt a Revolution, and MICT. Shar is supported by the US government funding through Chemonics.
In this sense, the role and the journalistic practices that characterize the new generation of Kurdish media have to be considered, on the one hand, in the context of the Syrian information environment after 2011, and, on the other hand, in the context of Rojava and its specific status during the Syrian uprising.
The structure of independent media and their nature
The "Independent" media in Syria born after 2011, including those established in Rojava, are young outlets, mainly led by young journalists or activists. None of them is economically sustainable, since the conflict does not enable them to sell copies or advertising. Instead, they rely entirely on funding by international NGOs and governments, which is renewed year by year. As a consequence, they are small media organizations, and they can rarely can plan long-term strategies. The only organization which appears large in relative size is Arta FM, which as a community radio uses its spaces as a place providing services for their community in Amouda, like education and trainings (Berko 2015).
Additionally, independent Syrian media are going through the difficult processes of institutionalization and professionalization in a context of great instability and high rates of staff turnover. Thus, even when the quality of the content is rapidly developing, they still have to struggle with skills shortages both at the administrative level and the journalistic level.
Producing Journalism in Rojava
The other factor that has to be considered when it comes to analysing Kurdish media in Syria is the recent history of Rojava in the aftermath of the Syrian uprising and the shaping of the Kurdish autonomous administration. In 2012, the Syrian regime retired its security forces from the majority of Kurdish areas in order to redeploy them in other regions. The PYD, and its armed militias, People Protection Units (YPG and YPJ), rapidly filled this vacuum and occupied the abandoned administrative buildings. The process of taking power resulted sometimes in violent clashes with other Kurdish opposition forces, and some political leaders were expelled (Desoli 2015).
There is no doubt that the PYD, thanks to its superior power in terms of organization and For the same reasons, local civil society organizations, independent from political parties, and often critical towards them, thrived in the last few years, and found in the emerging Kurdish media a privileged channel for getting visibility.
Generally, the journalists from Kurdish media tend to acknowledge that they enjoy a level of freedom of expression and of movement that their colleagues in other parts of Syria do not have. However, the hegemony of the PYD tends to have a strong impact on the political life, civil society, and journalistic freedom. Many journalists have denounced pressures put by the party and its security services on the media. On 15 August 2014, the Kurdish Supreme Committee founded the Union of Free Media, entrusted to regulate the media field in Rojava. The Union of Free Media provides legal permits necessary to the media outlets to operate in the area. Officially, the institution was born as an independent body to regulate the media field, protecting journalists, and enhance freedom of expression. However, many local journalists consider it as a tool in the hands of the PYD and the autonomous administration to control and supervise independent media outlets. we find that the professional identity of Kurdish independent media and the type of journalism they produce are the result of the intersection of several factors. As explained above, the political economy of these outlets is very similar to those of Syrian emerging media and they are strictly dependent on the aid of international organizations and governments. With Syrian media they also share a common history: the absence of a professional journalism under the Baathist rule and the sudden emergence of a new generation of journalists and media institutions. At the same time, the development of Kurdish independent media is also deeply influenced by the specific history of the Kurdish people in Syria and the repression of their identity at least since the post-colonial period. Moreover, the status of Rojava after 2011, and the geopolitical role of the Kurds in relation to the other actors involved in the Syrian conflict (especially ISIS, the Syrian regime and opposition, and Turkey) contributed to shaping the professional identity of these outlets and how they perceive their role towards society and the international community.
In this context, we can identify three main elements that shape the strategy of Kurdish media in Syria: First, they define themselves primarily in opposition to party media, and in particular to those of the PYD, and they rather present themselves as the tools of expression of civil society movements in particular identity, Kurds need first of all to make their voice heard in Syria. In the eyes of journalists, this can be obtained only through reinforcing independent media outlets. As Hevidar Malla, a Kurdish journalist, writes: "Since Kurdish political parties acted as umbrellas for Kurds since the 1960s, the media profession has been intricately connected to them. The parties have not been able to abandon their out-dated strategies in the media field. Their work is mostly through pamphlets, statements, and some studies. It is mostly aimed at Kurdish regions -and sometimes only at party members -and it functions as no more than party propaganda" (Malla 2012).
Conclusion
Independent media in Rojava established after 2011 developed a specific professional identity that distinguishes them both from party-linked media in the region but also from the other Syrian independent media. As described, the way that Kurdish journalists at the centre of this article perceive their role is part of a strategy enabling them to interact with different actors and to operate in a context characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Smets (2016) , in his study on Kurdish television channels in Turkey and Europe, refers to similar modes of negotiated strategies necessitated by the constraints of conflict and the uncertainties it entails. As such, framing their outlets as not Kurdish enables Kurdish journalists to adapt to difficult economic and political conditions, while at the same time allows them to pursue the objective of obtaining the right for Kurds of freely expressing and practicing their cultural identity.
As we have seen, the construction of their professional identity is based on three main elements that reinforce each other and at the same time shape a coherent journalistic identity in opposition with other journalistic actors in Syria and the region. The decision to distinguish themselves from party-linked media, and especially the PYD, relies on the strong conviction that the creation of a democratic society, in which civil society is stronger, is the only viable way for Kurds to reach their national aspirations. In their view, party-media not only are the expression of hegemonic projects that can endanger the future democracy of Rojava, but are also inadequate when it comes to communicating the Kurds' points of view both in Syria and abroad. Against this background, strengthening the Kurdish identity, albeit considered important, is perceived as less urgent than developing journalistic standards capable of promoting these issues to multiple publics. For the same reason, the majority of the journalistic production is not in Kurdish, with Arabic being more relevant and with some outlets even making recur to other languages like English, Syriac and Armenian.
The choice of language, as well as the prominence given to pluralism in contrast to any partisan political project, reinforces the multi-sectarian approach of independent media. In fact, independent media in Rojava refuse to be identified as Kurdish media for several reasons. First, they acknowledge the multi-sectarian tissue of society in Rojava and in this way they reinforce their role as pluralistic media. Second, they can promote a strategy for the Kurds, which is in their eyes more realistic or at least less threating for other political actors both in Syria and abroad. Adopting a Syrian approach to the Kurdish issue instead of a pan-Kurdish approach in other words enables them to pursue their political aim, while at the same time preserving their existence as media institutions.
